in China. Firstly, there is the authoritarian efficiency thesis, which argues that China is able to maintain a stable political environment, sustainable economic growth and high level of human development because of China's authoritarian system. The identifiable characteristics of that model include the absence of political opposition to the Party; the dominant role of the Party in state affairs; a parchment division of powers within the state and between the state and the society; a rubber stamp congress and a compliant judiciary; and, above all, managed public participation. In spite of institutional adaptation and innovation, the political structure in its core remains intact and the Party remains in control (Naughton and Yang, 2004) . The concentration of political power allows the Party to make tough decisions and remain decisive in designing and achieving its policy objectives, and the decisiveness in decision-making and effectiveness in policy implementation in turn allow the Party to better manage corruption and reduce the negative impact that corruption may otherwise have.
The structure of corruption differs in different regime types and correspondingly corruption may have different impact on the political and economic system (Wedeman, 1997 (Wedeman, , 2012 . Because of the effective macro-control, corruption in China is more "managed" and less destructive and predatory than the case elsewhere. There are variants in that argument, ranging from that corruption plays a facilitative role in China's unique economic transition; that corruption is stable and regularized and could be absorbed effectively as part of the cost in doing business in China; to that the impact of the otherwise predatory corruption is back-loaded with its destructive nature to be revealed only in a distant future. Despite the variation, the common thread that ties all the argument together is that, while corruption remains prevalent, it is well managed in China so as not to undermine the economy and social stability.
Authoritarianism allows the Party to take draconian anticorruption measures that are often unconstrained by law and unaccountable to the public. Commentators have pointed out the powerful Party disciplinary mechanism that wields extraordinary extra-legal power in investigating and disciplining Party officials, including extra-legal power of detention incommunicado; aggressive interrogation without legal representation; a compliant legal system to rubber-stamp the Party's decisions; periodical campaign against corruption; and the use of harsh penalties (Sapio, 2011) .
Ultimately, it is the disciplinary power of a Leninist Party and its disregards of laws and rights that matter the most in anti-corruption enforcement (Hsu, 2011) .
Secondly, there is the authoritarian benevolence thesis. According to that thesis, the Party is not only powerful but also claims to exercise the power as the guardian of national interest. It is often said that there is an anti-democracy instinct in China's one party state, which co-exists with an anticorruption instinct. The Party gained its political power by overthrowing a corrupt regime, and has been vigilant in preventing and punishing corruption. As powerful as it is, the Party claims that it does not have any interest of its own and holds political powers merely to serve the best interest of the nation and the people (Nathan, 1986) . The Party's claim has historical resonance. It has been said that state leaders in the Confucian tradition tend to be paternalistic and more self-constraining in exercising power, thus less prone to grand corruption as often observed among dictators elsewhere. For all its authoritarian traits, Confucianism emphasizes a strong and meritocratic bureaucratic system and personal ethics and moral obligations to be accountable to the people, which serve as external and internal controls over the rulers (Bell, 2012; Fukuyama, 2005 Fukuyama, , 2007 Fukuyama, , 2011 . Being moderated by Confucian ethics, rulers in that tradition are self-limiting and self-correcting in the exercise of power, and there is a built-in self-regulatory mechanism to prevent excessive corruption and abuses. As corrupt as they may be, political leaders are committed to nation-building and long-term growth (Hsu, Wu and Zhao, 2011) and would not allow corruption to undermine their larger nationalist agenda.
Under that cultural tradition, corruption may be less predatory and less destructive to the economy (Wedeman, 1997) . In the Chinese case, the Party is ready to acknowledge the shocking degree of corruption within the political system and the potential political damage that corruption may inflict, and is determined to face up to the challenges. Importantly, Party leaders in China are not widely known to be predatory in enriching themselves that characterize other high-corruption states.
Simply put, China is not (yet) a kleptocracy.
Finally, there is the authoritarian legitimacy thesis. Because of the combination of efficiency with benevolence, the authoritarian government receives wide popular support, with labor, entrepreneur, and the middle class all expressing a high level of trust on the regime (Bell, 2012; Nathan, 1995; Perry, 2007; Wright, 2010) . Indeed, the trust is so high that there is little need for mobilization and non-institutional participation. The high trust manifests itself in two characteristics. Firstly, anticorruption activities are locally-oriented with goals rarely going beyond attracting the attention of higher authorities, punishing corrupt local officials and stopping egregious local practices. Petitioners, protesters and other stakeholders who demonstrate a high degree of deference to, and confidence in, the higher level authority's commitment and competence in solving the problem, are more prone to petition to higher authorities. In doing so, they expressly attribute the cause of the corruption squarely to the failure in policy implementation at the local levels and abuse of local officials in the process (Bell, 2012; Li, 2008) . In sum, it is the bad apples that are to blame.
Secondly, anti-corruption activism is rule-based and anti-corruption protest does not go beyond the implementation of rights as provided in Party norms and state laws. There is abundant "rule consciousness" but a deficit of "right consciousness" independent of the Party rules and state laws (Perry, 2007) . Rights consciousness, where it exists, is based on, and derives from, rule consciousness (Lorentzen and Scoggins, 2010) . Perry (2007) , doubting the possibility of a "rights" discourse in China, goes as far as arguing that the state proclamation of rights is not different from the state propaganda in the past of "class struggle". Therefore, protest in post-Mao China is not qualitatively different from that in Mao's China and both are regime-supportive, sharing similar protest symbols, repertoire and goals. Extending the argument to its logic end, anticorruption enforcement is authorized and controlled by the state and operate according to the official rules of the game (Perry, 2007: 21) .
As such, it is neither politically destabilizing nor regime subversive. 
Anti-Corruption Initiatives: From Transparency to Participation
The following section of this paper provides three examples of international learning: 1) auditing of government budget and expenditure to enhance fiscal accountability; 2) open government information (OGI) system to allow better access to government information; and 3) the rise of social media which mobilizes anticorruption activism in the civil society. These three examples are chosen for three related reasons in addition to the fact that they are widely discussed in China. Firstly, these examples represent anticorruption intervention at different levels. Government auditing represents a top-down intervention and works mainly inside government departments; OGI represents a dynamic interaction between civil society actors and the government; and social media offers both opportunity and incentives for a spontaneous and bottom-up social mobilization.
2 China's acceptance of authoritarian rule and tolerance of government corruption are often studied in the particular Chinese cultural setting in which corruption is practiced. China's gift-giving culture and the imperatives of reciprocity in personal relationship provide a fertile ground on which corruption grows. Indeed, many commentators have argued that corruption and gift-giving may be indistinguishable to a significant degree and it is impossible for the law to identify where gift-giving ends and where corruption begins. Cultural tolerance of gift-giving and reciprocity desensitizes corrupt transaction, and the embeddedness of corruption in the cultural practice allows the society to absorb the destructive impact of corruption.
Secondly, those examples serve as proxies for larger policy changes and point to the direction of future and more structural reform. Auditing and its accountability structure invite congressional oversight of government fiscal policies and therefore enhance the separation of powers in China's political system; OGI mechanisms demand transparency, accountability and the rule of law in the government decision-making process; and social media provides the best opportunity of democratic deliberation and political participation in China. Finally, all three mechanisms are concerned with access to information. An authoritarian system habitually misinforms its citizens and the best antidote for corruption, as supplied by the three reform mechanisms, is to place the government "under the sunshine".
Government Auditing
The structural problem in China's "unusual" budgetary system and the lack of accountability in government expenditure (Wong and Bird, 2008 ) mattered significantly in explaining the prevalence of corruption and its resilience. On the budgetary side, it is well-known that extra-budgetary fund (EBF) is widely used to compensate for the budgetary shortfall and to enhance government revenues. EBF includes fees, fines, levies and other hidden revenues that the government permits but does not effectively control. Local governments are too eager to explore extra-revenue to meet their expenditure. On the expenditure side, there is little meaningful monitoring and accountability and individual departments have wide discretion in the fiscal process. The combination of discretion in revenue-collection and the lack of control in expenditure naturally led to wide-spread misconduct and corruption.
Officials kept part of the money collected in their own pockets before handing them over to the departments, and departments with a fee-generating capacity set up their own secretive "small treasuries" and spend the money they collect for their own benefit (Fu and Choy, 2004; Wedeman, 2000) .
A significant first step in the fiscal reform undertaken by Zhu Rongji as the Premier was to remove the power to collect fees and levies from individual officials, with the ultimate goal to create a clear separation between revenue-gathering and from expenditure in the fiscal system. Before Zhu's reform, for example, traffic police were required to issues tickets to drivers for violating road traffic rules and collect fines on the spot. Not surprisingly, officers were eager to issue as many tickets as possible and personally keep as much of the fines as they could. After the reform, fines would be paid directly into a government banking account and money would no longer change hands between police and drivers. A simple mechanism of payment changes the landscape of police corruption on the streets (Fu and Choy, 2003) .
Once placing individual level corruption under some control, the government moved the next target to "small treasuries" and the principal tool in policing illicit "small treasuries" and illicit spending is government auditing. Constitutionally, auditing agencies are accountable directly to the corresponding people's congress. In 1983, the first national audit office, the China National Audit Office (CNAO) was established with the responsibility to investigate the accounts of government departments. In 1995 the Audit Law was promulgated and the first comprehensive auditing took place in 1996. Under the Audit Law, the auditing offices review the budget implementation of all government entities and all public funds and assets are the targets of audit (Li, 1998) . As Li Jinhua, a former Auditor General of the CNAO said that the CNAO is the "watchdog" of state assets with the duties to ensure a degree of fiscal rule of law and fiscal transparency.
The CNAO conducted its first serious audit in 1999 which revealed widespread irregularities, wastage and abuses on the part of the central ministries, including delayed preparation of budgetary plans, lax fiscal management, misuse of EBF, and diversion of EBF for profit-making activities. The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) favorably received the report. Although the report and the reporting process were not well covered in the media, it was the first time that China rigorously audited central ministries and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and reported the auditing results to the standing Committee of the NPC (Bao, 2004) .
Incidentally, aggressive publicity of audit reports was inspired by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). In 2001, while Premier Zhu Rongji was receiving David Walker, the U.S. Comptroller General, Head of the GAO, the guest mentioned the audit information disclosure system that was implemented in the U.S..
Upon knowing that such a system existed in China, the Premier made the decision that as long as the information was accurate, they should be truly and comprehensively reported to the NPC's Standing Committee (Bao, 2004) . The CNAO auditing has uncovered shocking level of corruption and waste in both central and local governments and in both government departments and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), and the revelations has also led to certain disciplinary and legal actions against officials directly involved in the corrupt practices. While there were reservations on the long term impact of the audit storms, the CNAO is duly credited for its courage in confronting and unveiling problems that have long been in existence.
3 Since 2003, the scope of audit has gradually expanded from auditing income and expenditure to covering effectiveness of government fiscal management, including unreasonable budget estimation, slow progress in project implementation;
and inappropriate policies in the SOEs. Attempts are also made to extend the audit storm to local governments although auditing at local levels proves to be more difficult. At the central level, the CNAO continues to conduct rigorous audits, publicize the names of offending organs, and recommend solutions, in spite of the resistance from some central Ministries.
Open Government Information
The Open Government Information Regulations (OGI Regulations) took effect in
2008.
The law requires all administrative agencies, subject to certain conditions, to publicize or make available information they have created or obtained in the course of carrying out their duties and to provide information to members of the public upon request. There is a statutory requirement for government departments to supply certain information through government reports, official websites, press conferences, broadcasting, television, etc. and to send certain information to designated archives and public libraries for public access. Regarding disclosure on application, applicants may only apply for disclosure of information that relates to their "special needs for production, livelihood activities or scientific research". An administrative organ may refuse to disclose government information on the ground of state secret, commercial secret, or involvement of privacy of a third party. With the promulgation of the OGI Regulations, Chinese citizens enjoy a limited legal right to know.
While the OGI system is mandated by the UNCAC, it also drew broadly from international experiences and reflected a domestic need for transparency and accountability. OGI is part of China's on-going open government initiatives, including earlier programs on "transparency in government affairs", and other OGI initiatives.
While there are significant legal, political and cultural hurdles to the successful implementation of the OGI Regulations (Fu, 2009; Horsley, 2010) , the OGI Regulations provide an additional stimulus to enhance transparency, strengthen accountability, and improve governance. If the Administrative Litigation Law, which allows citizens to file complaints in courts against a specific violation of the law or dereliction of duty on the part of the government, provides a shield for citizens to protect their rights from official infringement, the OGI Regulations are, potentially, swords for citizens to monitor the government more proactively and effectively.
There is also a strong demand for OGI in China's emerging civil society. Activist lawyers, reporters, and other informed members of the society are mobilizing the law to push for a more open government. Most noticeably, green NGOs have been working to increase both the supply of and demand for government information. On the supply side, they have organized training for officials in environmental protection agencies and assisted in drafting more detailed and meaningful local rules on accessing environmental information. On the demand side, they have worked with lawyers and activists in requesting information and bringing the authorities to court when their requests are denied (Horsley, 2010) .
Activist lawyers and rights advocates have indeed seized the opportunity to exercise the right to know upon the promulgation of the law. Xu Zhiyong and Gongmeng (also known as "Open Constitution Initiative" in English) have been active in identifying cases to test the OGI Regulations.
3 Another veteran lawyer, Hao Jinsong, is also actively involved in OGI cases. 4 There are encouraging signs of academic activism on access to government information, and more law professors are filing applications for information disclosure and bringing cases to public and media attention. Tsinghua To the credit of the government at all levels, a large amount of government information has already been publicized within the short history of the implementation of the OGI Regulations, and the system has improved in spite of the limitation in its institutional design and implementation. . Indeed, the government has also used the OGI mechanism to enhance bureaucratic control and ensure faithful implementation of central policies. By providing information through official websites, press conferences and other means in a timely fashion, the government can guide, shape, and, in the end, control public opinions.
Generally speaking, the items of information that are voluntarily disclosed by the central and provincial governments have been increasing since 2008, while those disclosed by city governments have remained largely unchanged. On the other hand, the number of OGI-based requests for information from city governments has increase quickly although that from the central and provincial governments has changed little. Another healthy sign is the increase in judicial review applications in spite of the judicial caution and passivism (Chen, 2012) .
There are great variations and some places are performing much better than others.
It is important to assess the performance closely to develop a clear understanding as to what makes a difference. In a large-scale study (Lorentzen, Landry and Yasuda, 2010) , the OGI performance of 113 cities were assessed according to eight dimensions. The overall performance was disappointing: with 63 points out of a total of 100 as basic compliance, the means score was 31.06 and the median was only 26.6. The lowest reached 10.2. But an otherwise critical review also pointed to the potential of OGI in
China. The highest score in the survey attained 72.9 points. The best predictor for good performance was the wealth of the city: better developed infrastructure and institutions for the OGI system; better-managed and more open government; better educated and informed residents with more demand for open government. In addition, wealthy cities tend to rely less on SOEs and have a more diversified economy. Other factors contributing to better OGI in a city included the education background of mayors, with cities administered by mayors with legal training background doing better than others; and the length of services of the mayors in a city -the longer the stay, the better the OGI system. OGI is thus likely to improve when cities accumulate their wealth, diversify their economy and make a smart decision in choosing their leaders.
Like the rule of law in general, the OGI Regulations are a double-edged sword. While they empower and legitimize the government through information management and control, the regulations are a useful tool in the hands of the citizens and have also developed the potential to constrain government power (Horsley, 2010) . As part of the on-going reform to liberalize governance in China, the new OGI Regulations have the potential to help drive the development of a more transparent, responsive, and accountable government. The litmus test in the decade to come is: whether the government can be forced, through litigation, public opinion, or other means, to publicize information that is inconvenient, embarrassing, or even outright offensive to the government.
The Rise of Social Media
A free and independent press is often regarded as a necessary condition for clean government, and countries with a higher level of press freedom tend to have a lower level of corruption. Since corruption is mostly a consensual crime that happens in the dark, a free press with its probing investigative journalism is regarded as indispensible to bring corruption to light. In democracies, publicity of corruption scandals could mobilize public support, generate pressure to force corrupt officials to resign, and ultimately causes an electoral defeat of the political party that is implicated in corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1999).
The Chinese press does not share the major characteristics that define a free press, however. In China, there is little open political competition, low level of public participation and weak protection of civil and political rights, in particular the freedom of speech. On the contrary, the press is owned and controlled by the Party and the Party has historically placed severe restrictions on investigative reporting, especially the reporting of the negative events such as corruption.
Yet, for a combination of reasons, the press in China has been playing a significant role in exposing certain corruption and forcing the Party to take more anti-corruption actions. Firstly, there is the agency problem and central authorities, because of information asymmetry, need to rely on the press to expose local corruption so as to discipline local officials more effectively. Economic reform has led to an increase in local political powers and an increase in local corruption and abuses in violation of central rules. In this new context, the media, as a controlled forum, is well placed to serve as "representatives and trustees of the public, translating raw public opinion into a collective, supervisory role." (Cheung, 2007: 363) In doing so, media develops a potential to become an influential actor in monitoring the government (Liberman, 2005) .
Secondly, the media in the reform era has developed a self-interest in aggressive news reporting. Forced to be financially independent, the media is managed as a business and has to follow business logic. Like its counterparts in a market economy, media in China relies on advertizing revenue which in turn relies on circulation and reader preference. Corruption scandals are provocative and popular news among readers and there are sufficient incentives in the media for journalists to launch their own investigation, as illustrated by the popularity and resilience of investigative journalism in China (Cullen and Fu, 1998) . Of course, state media is under the tight control of the Party and, within the authoritarian political structure, it is unlikely to become an independent watchdog (Cheung, 2007; Keller, 2003) . Examples abound in which the netizen-led action has led to successful publicity, investigation and prosecution. An official from Nanjing was pictured when making a speech criticizing developers for selling property at below-market value. The speech was controversial and attracted public attention. He was hunted and was later identified as Zhou Jiugen, a district housing management bureau chief. In the photo, he was smoking an expensive brand of cigarette (called "95 Supreme") which sells at 1,500 RMB per carton). From a pack of cigarette, netizens through HFS discovered Zhou's expensive watch, car and in general a luxury life style. The continuous exposure finally led to an official investigation. Zhou was subsequently sentenced to 11 year imprisonment for taking 1.2 million RMB in bribes. 5 In another case, an official who was pictured smiling at a tragic traffic accident scene angered netizens.
Through collective vigilantism, they identified the person as the Shaanxi Safety
Inspection Bureau Chief, Yang Daicai. Further HFS revealed that Yang wore different watches, all expensive ones, on different occasions. All the photos were posted online with highlights on the watches and calls for further investigation. 6 In response, Yang was removed from his post.
The intrusive HFS has on many occasions degenerated into online mob rule -"a 21st century version of the medieval 'stockade'" (Eberlein, 2008 ; see also Chao, 2008), but when the search aims at corruption, the intrusion and aggression prove to be the most effective anti-corruption tool -"a 24-hour-a-day nightmare for government officials across China" (Mackinnon, 2012) state media. Because of the aggressive HFS, corruption scandals and critical reflections first appear in social media, and are followed up, not without some reluctance, by the official media if only try to remain relevant and to mould public mood. With over 500 million Internet users keenly watching the government, the Internet is bound to be an influential political actor which is hard to rein in.
In response, the Party has become more responsive to cyberactivism by taking effective remedial actions. Typically, as in Zhou Jiugen's case and many other cases, the Party orders a prompt investigation once detecting a collective wrath from the public and, not surprisingly, finds sufficient evident that warrants a disciplinary action or criminal punishment. The official action is often swift and the officials, with the issue involving them, vanish quickly from public view. Beyond the individual cases, the government stays engaged with the online civil societal forces. Auditing may be distorted, and OGI-based application may be denied, but the battle against corruption has been fought in the court of public opinions through public mobilization. In the end, the Party is forced to take the pulse of public opinions carefully and to treat it seriously. Those mechanisms are not merely empty talks or window dressing. They deliver in part and create their own winners and losers. Each anticorruption initiative opens its own space and opportunities for legal action and political reform. The mechanisms may be structurally defective in design and poor in their implementation and as such they attract waves of criticisms that they deserve. But after all the criticisms are voiced, people continue to go back to the mechanisms for future improvement. The audit reports could be more effectively implemented; courts should have been more active in creating and enforcing the right to know in OGI-based judicial review; and there could be better coordination between online activism and offline mobilization in anticorruption activities. As defective as they are, those mechanisms do not generate a wholesale rejection and cynicism which may lead to radicalism. the few institutional tools in Green Watershed's possession to engage the authorities and compel them to act. Through online mobilization, Green Watershed successfully drew wide public attention to the case. After all, the toxic has produced a cancer village near the Nanpan River which happens to be the source of Pearl River in Guangdong. But online activism cannot replace offline action and when it comes to offline mobilization, the OGI system offers the best available tool to initiate an action.
Authoritarian Resilience and Anticorruption Initiatives
Armed with the OGI regulations and the implementing rules, the Green Watershed have tried approach the provincial environmental protection department, the bank that finances the enterprise and the banking regulatory agency for a wide-range of information. OGI-based action is clearly a tempting and useful stepping stone into government offices.
Finally, those anticorruption initiatives offer a hope that corruption can be solved through incremental institutional innovation, and the accumulated effect of small changes may ultimately reach a tipping point in the political system. The institutional innovation may be ineffective to control grand corruption that happens at the higher echelon of the government, but it is effective in putting the routine and petty corruption that directly affect the daily life activities of ordinary people under some effective control. Ordinary citizens are most vigilant in monitoring frontline representatives of the Party-state, such as tax collectors, police officers, judges and urban management personnel, and it is not surprising that Chinese social media is full of reports on abuse and corruption in matters that concern the daily life of the ordinary people. When corruption at the lower end is controlled, corruption is removed from public view. While undoubtedly continuing to exist, corruption has become hidden and become a more remote issue for the ordinary citizens. A tighter control and discipline of the lower level civil servants generate more public confidence in the system and could solidify the system at its foundational level.
At the same time, anticorruption initiatives offer hope for more structural reforms.
The aggressive auditing offers some hope of top-down anti-corruption reform within the government ministries. The regular auditing and the revelation of systematic misuse of public fund and embezzlement appear to be an excellent entry point to political reform at a structural level. The fact that a Ministry could keep and misuse millions of dollars raises a series of questions relating to financial accountability, budgetary process, congressional oversight and, ultimately, tax-payers' rights. In direct response to the auditing storm, the NPC, potentially as an alternative power house, strengthens its grip over the fiscal process by setting up an independent Budget Committee. There has also been discussion to further legislative enactment to place the revenue and spending powers of the government organs under more effective congressional control.
OGI offers a similar opportunity at a deeper structural level. After the promulgation of the OGI Regulations, ordinary people have developed a keen interest in knowing government entertainment budget and assets of Party officials. The new OGI Regulations, the subsequent legal actions and lively online discussions surrounding the matter are nurturing a healthy dose of cynicism about officialdom and, from which, a culture of political accountability. There is now mounting pressure for a legislation to compel Party and state officials to disclose their personal assets.
Finally, the Internet offers the best accountability mechanism and the best forum of democratic participation in China. Undoubtedly, with its strong Chinese characteristics, HFS is a convenient and effective instrument in the on-going popular war against corruption. The collective online vigilance galvanizes public support, puts officials on notice and compels the Party to take effective and visible remedial actions.
Significantly, the Internet is creating an alternative community of voices and an alternative source of power in the virtual world in competition with those in the real world. The Internet is set to continue to offer forums and possibilities for more institutionalized public deliberation and political participation (Leib and He, 2006; Jiang, 2008; Yang, 2010) .
The Limit of Authoritarian Adaptation
China's authoritarian resilience has its limit and the authoritarian thesis mentioned at the beginning of the paper is substantially weakened upon closer examination. First of all, the benevolent thesis is being falsified in front of the eyes of the general public.
The Bo Xilai affairs and the aftermath reveal the uglier side of the political system and the shocking scale of violence, corruption and moral decay among political elites.
The scandal challenges the myth of the Chinese exceptionalism and lays bare the fact that despite the tough rhetoric, the Party, with corrupt interest institutionalized and entrenched at the core, is not able to control the spread of corruption. Contrary to the claim of benevolence, political corruption is reaching, and is seen to reach, the Party's political core and running out of control. While China no longer has a single despot and will not resemble other kleptocracies in the structure and pattern of corruption, it is developing its own predatory corruption and increasingly, the Party itself is seen as part of the problem instead of the solution. For some, China practices "crony communism" (Dickson, 2011) in which predatory Party leaders rob the nation of its wealth (Pei, 2006) . Greed and corruption exposed by the CNAO and the petty corruption that the HFS exposes are slowly eating away at the Party's credibility.
Without the anticorruption credibility it claims, the authoritarian system is not as efficient as it appears when confronted with powerful interests and a massive corruption problem. The shortage of political will aside, China's authoritarianism is highly fragmented and the complicated policy process, which relies heavily on vertical and horizontal consensual building through negotiation, renders implementation of anticorruption policies extremely difficult (Lieberthal, 1995) . After all the rough rhetoric against corruption, the Party's investigation rarely leads to criminal prosecution, and indeed merely a tiny percentage of the officials investigated by the Party's disciplinary machinery for corruption are later prosecuted in court.
China runs a soft anti-corruption regime in which criminal law, despite the recent amendment and expansion, remains marginal. It remains the case that the Party's soft law prevails and the Party largely internalizes its own corruption problem. While the Party will continue to prosecute egregious cases, it will also make sure that prosecution would not sabotage the political loyalty of its members. The political imperative necessitates highly selective investigation and prosecution.
While many of the anticorruption initiatives are innovative, they tinkers at the margin of politics and become diluted during implementation. The innovative measures such as auditing, OGI, media exposures may not be able to tame the corrupt impulse within the Party, and the piecemeal institutional reform may not have the potential to serve as a catalyst for further structural change. Take audit for example, realistically what the auditors could achieve beyond the naming and blaming of some individual offenders is highly doubtful. As a subordinate organ of the State Council, the CNAO's power is limited because it faces a problem that is common to the entire government. Central ministries are powerful. Financial irregularities, and for that matter, corrupt practices, are not regarded as a politically risky business. At the end of the day, a few officials may receive Party discipline or criminal punishment, but the same institutional corruption re-surfaces every year. As the People's Net -the official website of People's Daily, the Party's official newspaper -conceded in one of its online editorials that it is difficult to uncover problems, but it is more difficult to solve them.
9
It is not surprising that anticorruption initiatives may be launched in a highly ritualistic fashion but fall far short in their implementation. The Party is decisive in making new policies one after another, but it is far less resilient in their implementation because of the nature of authoritarian decision making (Cox and McCubbins, 2001) . The anticorruption policy process has a relatively short time span, and it rises and falls at short intervals. When a new program is initiated, there is no shortage of good will and determination to make it work. Each initiative could potentially have a significant impact in a particular policy area and offer a possible entry point into the larger political system. After all, the initiatives such as auditing, OGI, and many others have worked in other societies and could be made to work in China only if properly implemented. Given the political constraints, institutional innovation, while continuous, is bound to be "shallow" and scratch at surfaces. Anticorruption reform, which has been most active in the past decade, shifts from one policy area to the other without creating sustainable results. Some anticorruption initiatives are of course more resilient than others, but each initiative on its own does not bite and it is impossible for an isolated mechanism to coalesce into a comprehensive anticorruption momentum.
Anticorruption enforcement appears like a hit-and-miss, guerilla warfare and does not develop a systemic, deep-level engagement. At the end of the day, anticorruption enforcement creates shocks more than hope; and offers surprises more than remedies.
There are abundant examples of short-term fixes with little long-term planning.
Finally, the authoritarian state may have encountered more difficulties than the conventional theories admit in its search for legitimacy (Bell, 2012) . The base of the legitimacy, according to the China model, lies in part in the trust in the Party to control corruption. Accordingly, while people loathe local corruption, they place their faith in the Party to sort out the problem. The logic of the Chinese authoritarianism is the reliance on the central patriarch as panacea to end all the local abuses. As a result, petitions regarding local grievances go to Beijing for a quick fix (Minzner, 2006) . But that design ironically weakens the level of trust and undermines Beijing's legitimacy, as the petitioners soon find out local officials do not cause all the miseries on their own and the central authorities are also part of the problem. When that happens, people may suspend their deference to the central authority, challenge the credibility and legitimacy of the system and resort to assertive, disruptive, and radical mobilization (Li, 2008 , Pils, 2012 . As Li (2008: 222) puts it, "High trust in the center induces petitioning which then may devastate that trust and thereby induce more aggressive popular actions."
People's trust in the Party and deference to authorities in general may be waning when they are less economically reliant on the government. Generally, economic freedom leads to political freedom in which economically independent people are more demanding of their government and less tolerant of government abuses and corruption (Inglehart and Welzel, 2008; Fukuyama, 1995) . Rule consciousness and rights consciousness may be a distinction without significant difference in understanding the struggles for rights in their daily life (Li, 2010; Wong, 2011) . As manifested in organized rallies and demonstration, people's concerns are more than egregious practice and petty corruption and their petitions often go beyond the implementation of existing rules as such. As HFS-exposed scandals seem to show, people are curious about petty corruption but they also cast significant doubt on the legitimacy of the system. Beyond the immediate grievances, citizens are demanding the right to know, the right to be heard, the right to express and, above all, the right to participate. In the online and offline mobilization against corruption, official rules, which are tolerant of misconduct, are hardly relevant.
If the faith in the political and legal institutions is fading, would people continue to channel their grievances through the institutions on which they no longer have faith?
Would lawyers and other civil society forces continue to rely on the institutional means and implement incremental reforms? How would the society react when citizens who report corruption and misconduct are harassed by the government, sued by officials for defamation, or detained by the police (van Rooij, 2012) ? To use the Green Watershed example again, the OGI Regulations empowered the NGO in the initial stage of the engagement by allowing a dialogue with department agencies. But all the departments declined to intervene and denied the application on dubious legal grounds: the bank cited commercial trade secret; the regulatory body pushed the applicant to the Environmental Protection Administration (EPA) and the EPA said it lacked the technical capacity to fill its duty. Something was clearly operating behind the scene to frustrate the exercise of a legal right, but there is little that the NGO can do to initiate a meaningful action. Would the Green Watershed or any other NGO continue to rely on the OGI system in demanding rights and advocating changes or engaging in more direct political activism?
Conclusion
It is evident that most of the reform in the past decade has been geared directly or indirectly toward anticorruption enforcement, and despite the political inertia, the government has produced significant institutional changes in the anticorruption field.
At least, the Party has faced up to the challenges and kept the anticorruption momentum going forward. Corruption is spreading and entrenching itself; the Party is also digging in; and the battle against corruption continues.
Conventional understanding has it that China fights against corruption in its own authoritarian way by relying on draconian measures to show-case its commitment and Those new institutional reforms signal the Party's commitment to adapt and learn; and there is sufficient evidence to prove that the Party has adapted and learned a lot.
Whether the Party can buy enough time to reform itself in time and pre-empt a corruption-generated political crisis is unknown. Corruption certainly exists in every political system and democracy per se does not offer any panacea. There is also strong evidence that corruption could be effectively controlled under authoritarianism. But China's authoritarian system faces a massive corruption problem which is deeply entrenched and intrinsically tied to the operation of the system. The Party may not be able to change itself in a significant way and, if that is the case, corruption will continue to spread and deepen. Without a deeper-level political reform, the institutional innovation and adaption will be too marginal, too slow and too little to have an impact. This paper argues that, for the time being, the implementation of the international anticorruption best practices in China has contributed to the Party's political stability and authoritarian resilience. But the future remains uncertain and is unfolding as we speak.
